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Regulating Bot Speech
Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo

ABSTRACT
We live in a world of artificial speakers with real impact. So-called "bots" foment political
strife, skew online discourse, and manipulate the marketplace. Concerns over bot speech
have led prominent figures in the world of technology to call for regulations in response
to the unique threats bots pose.
Recently, legislators have begun to heed these calls,
drafting laws that would require online bots to clearly indicate that they are not human.
This work is the first to consider how efforts to regulate bots might run afoul of the First
Amendment. At first blush, requiring a bot to self-disclose raises little in the way of free speech
concerns-it does not censor speech as such, nor does it unmask the identity of the person behind
the automated account. However, a deeper analysis reveals several areas of First Amendment
tension. Bot disclosure laws fit poorly with the state's stated goals, risk unmasking anonymous
speakers in the enforcement process, and create a scaffolding for censorship by private actors and
other governments.
Ultimately bots represent a diverse and emerging medium of speech. Their use for mischief should
not overshadow their novel capacity to inform, entertain, and critique. We conclude by urging
society to proceed with caution in regulating bots, lest we inadvertently curtail a new, unfolding
form of expression.
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INTRODUCTION

In May of 2018, Google released a powerful new assistive technology called
Duplex.' Duplex is a software system that can call up your hairdresser or favorite
restaurant and book you an appointment. What makes Duplex both exciting and
controversial is that the system mimics a real person-down to the "ums" and
pauses that characterize human speech.2 The receptionist who books an
appointment with Duplex is unlikely to know he is speaking with a machine
unless Google so discloses.
The concept of a machine posing as a person is hardly new. Recent
developments-technological, as well as political and economic-have elevated
attention to automated agents, or "bots." Social media in particular has proved a
fertile ground for this phenomenon. The presence of millions and millions of
automated accounts on Twitter, Facebook, and other platforms can be
disconcerting and even dangerous.' Bots can create an appearance of false
consensus, make a candidate or idea seem more popular than the reality, and even
hijack attempts at genuine dialogue and community building.' There is evidence
that bots created in Russia played a significant role in spreading disinformation
during the 2016 presidential election:' During the 2016 election, bot activity
pushing Trump campaign hashtags was timed to coincide with critical events like

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

Drew Harwell, A GoogleProgram Can Pass as a Human on the Phone. Should ItBe Required
to Tell People It's a Machine?, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (May 8, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/08/a-googleprogram-can-pass-as-a-human-on-the-phone- should-it-be-required-to-tellpeople-its-a-machine/?noredirect=on&utmterm=.6035140c540c
[https://perma.cc/7TK7YW9F].
Id.
See Craig Timber & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter Is Sweeping Out Fake Accounts Like Never
Before, Putting User Growth at Risk, WASH. POST (July 6, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/technology/2018/07/06/twitter-is-sweeping-out-fake-accounts-like-never-beforeputting-user-growth-risk/?utm term=.8abcffo9cf2a [https://perma.cc/G6JG-3YD5].
See infra Subpart I.B.
Gerrit De Vynck & Selina Wang, Russian Bots Retweeted Trump's Twitter 470,000 Times,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0126/twitter-says-russian-linked-bots-retweeted-trump-470-000-times
[https://perma.cc/9FAC-8KBH]; Chris Geidner, FederalProsecutors File the First Charges
Alleging 2018 Russian Election Interference, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 19, 2018, 3:01 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/chrisgeidner/first-charges-alleging-2018-electioninterference [https://perma.cc/9QSS-RVVX]; see also ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 28-29 (2019).
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debates and election day itself.6 Bots continue to foment political and cultural
discord as of this writing.
These and other concerns have led to calls for the government to step in.
Commentators, including the head of the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence
writing in the New York Times, publicly urge regulators to adopt a requirement
that all bots identify themselves as nonhuman.' Some regulators are heeding that
call. California passed a law making it unlawful for bots to engage in marketing
or electioneering without disclosing that they are not human.' The U.S. Senate is
also weighing a possible blanket bot disclosure law.9
This Article examines how mandatory disclosure laws that prohibit bots
from operating unless they identify themselves as nonhuman might fare under
principles of free expression. The question is an interesting one, in part because
a cursory First Amendment analysis obscures a deeper tension. Requiring a bot
merely to acknowledge that it is a bot does not appear at first blush to implicate
censorship or threaten the right to anonymous speech. However, requiring
across-the-board disclosure in response to specific concerns about political and
commercial dangers creates a risk of overbroad regulation. Furthermore, the
unintended consequence of bot disclosure laws for speech and privacy could be
significant-for example, where a person accused of running an illicit bot has to
prove they are human by revealing their actual identity. Crafting a narrowly
tailored, enforceable law requiring bot disclosure turns out to be much harder
than proponents realize, and indeed threatens to curtail an emerging form of
expression.
While a series of recent contributions has assessed whether bot speech is
covered by the First Amendment," this Article is among the first to discuss the
protections offered by the First Amendment in light of coverage." This Article's

6.

See generally BENCE
AUTOMATION

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

KOLLANYI ET AL., COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA PROTECT, BOTS AND
OVER
TWITTER
DURING
U.S.
ELECTION
3-4
(2016),

http://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/
politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2016/1 1/DataMemo-US-Election.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNY3-PZBM].
Oren Etzioni, How to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/opinion/artificial-intelligence-regulations-rules.html.
S.B. 1001, Cal. Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018). California's law goes into effect in July of 2019.
Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act, S. 3127, 115th Cong. (2018).
See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013);
Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and ArtificialIntelligence,
110 Nw. U. L. REV. 1169 (2016); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013).
Frederick Schauer discusses the distinction between First Amendment coverage and
protection at length in The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment: A PreliminaryExploration
of ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). He characterizes coverage as the
"boundaries" or "scope" of First Amendment application. Id. at 1768-69. Once the
threshold determination of coverage has been made, Schauer then turns to the question of
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analysis of real-world speech regulation suggests the potentially unique ways First
Amendment law may come to interact with autonomated speakers-an
interaction that is particularly interesting in light of the new forms of expression
bots permit and the very ambiguity surrounding their nature.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I delineates the inquiry by describing
bots and their common uses, benefits, and harms. Like the Internet itself, bots
enable "cheap speech"-communication that is easily and inexpensively
transmitted to the masses.12 They can also generate surprising speech-claims
about the world that even the programmer did not anticipate. And they can
create speech that fails to fall neatly into any particular category. To paraphrase
a now classic saying: On the Internet, nobody knows you're a bot." Bots' inherent
ambiguity not only creates potential for bot harm, but also allows for interesting
new possibilities for communication.
Parts II and III analyze the free speech concerns arising from proposed
regulations that force bots to identify themselves as nonhuman. We identify three
areas of potential First Amendment infringement, including an inadequate fit
between the government's stated ends and its chosen regulatory means; the
prospect that real people will have to reveal their identities to prove they are
human; and the prospect that bot disclosure requirements will provide a
scaffolding for private or foreign censorship of an emerging category of speech.
A final Part IV discusses the ramifications of bots, and early attempts to
regulate them, for free speech more generally. We propose a series of principles
aimed at creating space for this still emerging medium of speech, urging
legislators to consider creative applications of existing law, to legislate in a
piecemeal fashion, and to be mindful of the complexities inherent in the
enforcement of a bot disclosure law.

12.
13.

what protection the First Amendment offers: "When the First Amendment does show up, the
full arsenal of First Amendment rules, principles, standards, distinctions, presumptions, tools,
factors, and three-pan tests becomes available to determine whether the particular speech will
actually wind up being protected." Id. at 1769.
Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALEL.J. 1805, 1807 (1995).
See Glenn Fleishman, Cartoon Captures Spirit of the Internet, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 14, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/technology/cartoon-captures-spirit-of-theinternet.html ("On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog.").
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I.

BOTS: A TAXONOMY

A variation of "robot," the term bot is nontrivial to define.1 4 Whatever their
specific function or level of complexity, bots are software programs that run
according to instructions." We use the term here to refer to automated agents
that initiate communication online, by phone, or through other technologically
mediated means. We thereby exclude a wide variety of automated activity,
including the many software programs that "scrape" websites for information or
that perform automated functions such as purchasing stocks or event tickets. A
broad definition of bots also sweeps in automated assistants, such as Siri, Alexa,
Cortana, or Google's forthcoming Duplex, which act as interfaces between
devices and users.1 6 Bot disclosure laws could potentially reach these services as
well." The focus of our analysis, however, and that of recent calls for legislation,
is on interactive agents engaging in spontaneous communication with the public.
Bots offer certain interesting new affordances to programmers and users.
They are an explosive source of what Eugene Volokh referred to as "cheap
speech," that is, speech with low barriers and costs to the speaker." A bot could,
for example, find every single reference on Twitter to the famous scene in Star
Wars where Greedo confronts Han Solo and comment, accurately, that Han shot
first.1 9 An individual person could not. Moreover, bots display emergent
behavior, meaning that they regularly generate content that neither the
programmer nor the user of the bot could have clearly anticipated in advance.

14.

15.

16.
17.

18.

19.

For a working definition of robot, see Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103
CALIF. L. REv. 513, 529-32 (2015). See also infra Part III (discussing the challenges for
legislation posed by definitions).
See Matt Francis, 4 Things You Absolutely Need to Know About Software Bots,
WORKINGMOUSE (June 27, 2017), https://workingmouse.com.au/innovation/4-things-youabsolutely-need-to-know-about-software-bots [https://perma.cc/C87Y-3DPL].
Cf Robert Gorwa & Douglas Guilbeault, Unpacking the Social Media Bot: A Typology to Guide
Research and Policy, POL'Y &INTERNET 4 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.06863.pdf.
See Harwell, supra note 1 (discussing concerns about whether Duplex should have to disclose
that it is a bot). No proposed legislation to date has addressed artificially intelligent assistants,
however.
Volokh, supra note 12, at 1806-07. "Cheap speech" refers to forms of communication that
can reach many people without the involvement of formerly necessary institutions and
resources. Id. Writing in 1995, Volokh theorized that advancements in technology would
greatly lower the logistical barriers to entry into various communicative marketplaces-music,
news, books, and more, so even speakers without the wealth and power to secure printing presses
and the like could disseminate their message widely. Id.
Cf Kristopher Tapley, How the KasdansSettled the Biggest Debate in 'StarWars'History With
'Solo', VARIETY (May 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/solo-a-starwars-story-han-shot-first-lawrence-jonathan-kasdan-1202812392
[https://perma.cc/SK32R5F4].
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Although Microsoft did not program its Twitter bot, Tay, to use hateful language,
the bot infamously devolved into a "hate-spewing Nazi" after interacting with
other Twitter users for mere hours.20
Some bots can, subject to caveats and constraints, pose as human beings,
simulating a certain degree of interpersonal communication on a particular topic.
As far back as the 1960s, Joseph Weizenbaum illustrated the tendency we have to
anthropomorphize bots with his chatbot Eliza.21 Eliza was an automated
"therapist" that engaged subjects (mostly graduate students) with Rogerian
questions such as, "How does that make you feel?" The depth with which his
students engaged Eliza so troubled Weizenbaum that he wrote a book critiquing
social techniques in computing.22
Bots, even narrowly defined, are many and varied. So are their effects.
Commercial bots can alert consumers to better prices and new products and
services, but they may also gather information about consumers, spam people
with offers, or denigrate commercial competitors.23 Political bots can widen
participation but also manufacture a false sense of consensus and sow discord.24
Other bots delight and entertain, even enlighten.25 The sheer variety of bots, and
the variety of their uses and effects, has repercussions for the constitutional
analysis that follows in Part II. By way of illustration, here we discuss three
categories of bots: commercial, political, and creative.

20.

21.
22.

23.
24.

25.

April Glaser, Bots Need to Learn Some Manners, and It's On Us to Teach Them, WIRED (Apr.
13, 2016, 2:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/bots-emergent-behavior-deception
[https://perma.cc/B6ZU-9J8H]; see also Calo, supra note 14, at 538-39; infra note 85 (giving
the example of a Twitter bot that threatened an event in Amsterdam).
Joseph Weizenbaum, ELIZA -A Computer Programfor the Study of Natural Language
Communication Between Man and Machine, 9 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICs 26 (1966).
JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO
CALCULATION 6-7 (1976). Weizenbaum reported seeing long transcripts of chats with Eliza

that included students' intimate personal details. Id. at 7.
See infra Subpart I.A.
Lutz Finger, Do Evil-The Business of Social Media Bots, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2015,
9:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lutzfinger/2015/02/17/do-evil-the-businessof-social-media-bots/#45ab6ca4fb58 [https://perma.cc/E4LK-7694]; Samuel C. Woolley
& Douglas R. Guilbeault, Computational Propagandain the United States of America:
Manufacturing Consensus Online 8-9 (Computational Propaganda Res. Project,
Working
Paper
No.
2017.5,
2017),
http://blogs.oii.oxeac.uk/politicalbots/wpcontent/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-USA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4TQM-MKP5]; see
also infra Subpart I.B.
See infra Subpart I.C.
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Commercial Bots

Among the first sustained discussion of bots in legal discourse is Ian Kerr's
2004 critique of ELLEgirlBuddy, an instant messenger bot designed to chat with
teen girls online and encourage them to visit Ellegirl.com. 26 ELLEgirlBuddy
posed as a teenager on various instant-messaging services of the time.27 While
few mistook the bot for a real person, many interacted with the software
extensively. 2 8 As Kerr observes, this permitted Ellegirl.com not only to drive
traffic, but to glean insights about its advertising base of teenage girls by analyzing
transcripts of their chats with ELLEgirlBuddy.2 9
ELLEgirlBuddy is long retired, but commercial bots have evolved and
proliferated. We regularly encounter them in the form of interactive voice
systems when we call our banks or other customer service lines. We receive sales
marketing calls and struggle to discern whether we are speaking with a real
human or a robot." Many corporate entities use automated social media
accounts, from Puma to Coca-Cola to the New England Patriots." While the use
of automated bot accounts may create an occasional PR nightmare for these
companies (like when the official Coca-Cola Twitter account was tricked into
tweeting out text from Mein KaMpf),3 2 the use of bots largely allows corporations
to promote their brands online without incident.
In some cases, being able to communicate with an automated agent by
phone or a customer service chatbot online allows consumers to solve simple
problems and answer questions quickly and easily. Bots enable consumers to
handle problems on their own, which many consumers prefer over other means
of communication when engaging with a company." Commercial chatbots are

27.
28.
29.

Ian R Kerr, Bots, Babes and the Californicationof Commerce, 1U. OTTAWAL. & TECH. J. 285,
313 (2004).
Id. at 313-14.
Id.
Id. at 313-15.

30.

George Dvorsky, Freakishly Realistic Telemarketing Robots Are Denying They're Robots,

26.

31.

32.
33.

GIZMODO: 109 (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:20 AM), https://io9.gizmodo.com/freakishly-realistictelemarketing-robots-are-denying-t-1481050295 [https://perma.cc/K2BS-QJDE].
See Tanya Dua, 5 of the Biggest Bot Fails by Brand on Twitter, DIGIDAY (Feb. 9, 2015),
https://digiday.com/marketing/5-biggest-bot-fails-brands-twitter
[https://perma.cc/EB9V-ATFH].
Id.
ASPECT SOFTWARE, 2016 ASPECT CONSUMER EXPERIENCE INDEX 6, https://www.aspect.com/
globalassets/2016-aspect-consumer-experience-index-surveyindex-results-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VQ5H-UD4C] (finding that two-thirds of consumers surveyed felt good
about handling transactions without having to speak to a person).
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available at all hours of the day.34 They never get cranky or frustrated, even when
dealing with the most difficult customers." Perhaps most importantly, they can
significantly decrease the wait for customer service assistance.3 6
Yet commercial bots can also cause harm, primarily by tricking and
confusing consumers." Robocallers may deny that they are automated," call
targeted individuals repeatedly, and even claim to be a representative of the IRS
or another powerful entity that even a tech-savvy individual might feel too
anxious to hang up on.3 9 Vulnerable populations such as the elderly
are
particularly susceptible to scamming by robocallers.40
The Federal
Communications Commission recognizes the threat that robocalls pose to
consumers and has passed regulations against such practices.41 The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has won several lawsuits against companies with
predatory robocall practices.42 In late 2017, FTC representatives testified before
the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging to discuss the specific threat
robocalls pose to the elderly.43

34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Shep Hyken, Al and Chatbots Are Transforming the Customer Experience, FORBES (July 15,
2017, 9:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shephyken/2017/07/15/ai-and-chatbots-aretransforming-the-customer-experience/#657ee5a841f7 [https://perma.cc/C3DG-7SA5].
Id.
Id. Of course, the quality may suffer.
See generally Woodrow Hartzog, Unfairand Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REv. 785 (2015).
Dvorsky, supra note 30.
See, e.g., Hanna Landman, Phone Scams: Preying on the Elderly, AVACARE MED.: BLOG
(June 12, 2017), https://avacaremedical.com/blog/phone-scams-preying-elderly.html

[https://perma.cc/JW6G-6TXC]; IRS Urges Publicto Stay Alert for Scam PhoneCalls, IRS
(Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-urges-public-to-stay-alert-for-scam-

phone-calls [https://perma.cc/K3YG-D4MC].
40.

41.

Landman, supra note 39; Lois Greisman, Assoc. Dir. of the Div. of Mktg. Practices, Bureau of
Consumer Prot., Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the United
States Senate Special Committee on Aging (Oct. 4,2017).
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200-1202 (2018).

42.

See, e.g, FTC Providing $4 Million in Full Refunds to People Tricked Into Buying Bogus
"Extended Auto Warranties", FTC (July 19, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/07/ftc-providing-4-million-full-refunds-people-tricked-buying-bogus

[https://perma.cc/XBD6-32FG]; FTC and State of Florida Win Summary Judgment: Court
Orders Ringleader of Debt-ReliefScam to Pay $23 Million and Imposes Industry Bans, FTC
(Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/12/ftc-state-floridawin-summary-judgment-court-orders-ringleader [https://perma.cc/DP8G-2AUS];Sales Lead

GeneratorsFined andBarredFrom ViolatingFTC'sTelemarketingSalesRule, FTC (Nov. 1, 2016),
43.

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/1 1/sales-lead-generators-fined-barredviolating-ftcs-telemarketing [http://perma.cc/Q5ZE-9DGA].
Greisman, supra note 40.

Regulating Bot Speech

997

Bots can also skew the marketplace, for instance, by creating confusion in
product reviews.44 Online retailers commonly allow purchasers to leave reviews
of products, where they can provide helpful information about quality, fit, and
other details of use to potential buyers. These reviews are often accompanied by
a rating of the product, often out of five stars. Fake reviews can be used to drive
up a product's rating or drive down a competitor product's rating, and bots are
an effective way to create large numbers of fake reviews in a short amount of
time.45 This can mislead consumers and encourage them to purchase terrible
products with fraudulent positive rankings and reviews. While major online
retailers such as Amazon try to fight bot reviews, they struggle to do so.46
We anticipate that, as such technologies improve and proliferate, new
distortions will emerge. As noted earlier, Google recently debuted Duplex, its
new Al-powered personal assistant.47 Unlike other digital voice assistants,
Duplex can place outgoing calls and interact with humans on the other line,
though only in certain narrow contexts such as scheduling restaurant
reservations or hair appointments.48 Duplex received significant attention for its
sophistication level, as the demo calls Google released sounded impressively
humanlike.4 9 While it remains to be seen if Duplex fares as well in the real
world as its demos suggested, it seems likely that such technology may skew
marketplaces in ways yet unknown. Duplex opens up a door to new possibilities
that other tech firms are likely to walk through.
B.

Political Bots

Arguably the most troubling use of bots on social media arises in the
political context. The use of bots in the political arena is a more recently
recognized phenomenon than in the commercial context, so the attendant risks
are less well-understood. Though the full scope of their influence is still
unknown, recent investigations indicate that social media bots were used
extensively by a Russian government-linked organization to influence the 2016
American presidential election." Research by the Oxford Internet Institute
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Shareen Pathak, Amazon Reviews Have a Bot Problem, DIGIDAY (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://digiday.com/marketing/amazon-reviews-bot-problem [https://perma.cc/DJK4-ZKWP].
Id.
Id.
Harwell, supra note 1.
Id.
See id.
Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 U.S. Election, TWITTER BLOG (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en-us/topics/company/2018/2016-election-update.html
[https://perma.cc/B6VY-VQDC].
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shows that pro-Trump Twitter bots were four times as active as pro-Clinton bots
during the first presidential debate." This margin increased to a five-to-one
pro-Trump to pro-Clinton bot activity ratio by election day.52 Some even argue
that the long-term goal of this interference was to undermine democracy more
broadly, rather than to advocate for or against a particular candidate." While
some of these bots shared seemingly original content, others primarily magnified
existing content by "retweeting" posts, following prominent accounts, and
posting frequently about certain topics in order to make them "trend."54 The full
effect of this type of bot use has not yet been quantified, but it seems clear that
political bots may be used to skew discourse, to make certain ideas and
individuals appear more popular than they would be otherwise, and to stir up
dissent and discord.
For all of their dangers and flaws, however, political bots are in many ways
an extension of other forms of media and worthy of similar consideration.
Technology and the media in their many forms have long played a critical role in
the political context. The Federalist papers, published anonymously in New York
newspapers in the 1780s, helped sway popular opinion in favor of ratifying the
U.S. Constitution. Franklin D. Roosevelt used the radio to speak directly into the
homes of Americans with his fireside chats, later described as "a revolutionary
experiment with a nascent media platform."" John F. Kennedy won the support
of the American electorate by appearing "robust and confident" in the first
televised presidential debates.56 In 2011, social media entered the political fray by
way of the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East and
North Africa, social media enabled activists to share their messages and organize

51.
52.
53.

54.

55.

56.

KOLLANYI ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
Id.
Seema Metha, Rep. Adam Schiff Says Alleged Russian Meddling in Election Was an Effort to
Destroy American Democracy, L.A. TIMES: ESSENTIAL POL. (May 30, 2017, 1:42 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-schiff-arguesrussian-intervention-in-1496173190-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/KFJ8-ELKP].
See Gerrit De Vynck & Selina Wang, Russian Bots Retweeted Trump's Twitter470,000 Times,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0126/twitter-says-russian-linked-bots-retweeted-trump-470-000-times; Finger, supra note 24;
see also Woolley & Guilbeault, supra note 24, at 10-11.
Adrienne LaFrance, Donald Trump Is Testing Twitter's HarassmentPolicy, ATLANTIC (July 2,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/the-president-of-the-unitedstates-is-testing-twitters-harassment-policy/532497 [https://perma.cc/AAR2-PUUZ].
Kenneth T. Walsh, JFK First TV President, U.S. NEws (Nov. 20, 2013, 7:48 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/ken-walshs-washington/2013/11/20/jfk-first-tv-president.
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demonstrations against powerful authoritarian governments." Bots may be a
natural result of ever-evolving technology, and their unique qualities make them
a uniquely powerful means of communication in the political context.
Bots' distinct qualities also allow them to engage in nefarious online activity
that is difficult to quantify and control, however. Most visibly, bots can support
coordinated campaigns of disinformation. Perhaps most famously, U.S. officials
have accused the Russian government of using social media-including social
media bots-to interfere in American elections and sow discord." Although
seldom the only driver, hosts of bots can help spread false or misleading news or
else stoke national strife during a crisis or other salient news event. It is this
potential that has led federal lawmakers to grill social media executives at hearings
in recent months and to propose the disclosure requirements we highlighted in
the Introduction.59
Bots can also engage in online harassment at an unprecedented scale. By
automating "trolling," that is, the practice of criticizing or threatening certain
speakers (especially women and people of color) in response to their views, bots
can exacerbate highly problematic trends of online hate speech and abuse.6 0
Bots can harass or "troll" at scale. They can sink a useful hashtag by overusing it
and flooding the hashtag with useless or countermanding information. For
example, after the February 2018 school shooting in Parkland, Florida, Russiancontrolled bots joined many social media users in tweeting #guncontrolnow-but
accompanied the hashtag with messages, links, and images suggesting that stricter
gun control laws would not have prevented the tragedy.6 1

57.
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59.

60.
61.

Amy Mitchell et al., The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.joumalism.org/2012/11/28/role-social-media-arab-uprisings
[https://perma.cc/Q5ZE-9DGA].
Indictment
6-7, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF
(D.D.C. Feb. 16,2018); Taylor Hatmaker, Special CounselRobert Mueller Indicts Russian Bot Farm
for Election Meddling, TECHCRUNcH (Feb. 16,2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/16/muellerindictment-internet-research-agency-russia [https://perma.cc/96ET-9JQT].
See Karoun Demirjian, Top Senate Intel DemocratProposes Measures to Counter
Influence Campaigns on Social Media, WASH. POST (July 30, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/top-senate-intel-democrat-proposes-measuresto-counter-influence-campaigns-on-social-media/2018/07/30/50de4786-9420-11e8-810c5fa705927d54_story.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=.bod40d97cd03
[https://perma.cc/JF26YUBS]; see also Elizabeth Zima, California Wants to Govern Bots and Police User Privacy on
Social Media, Gov'T TECH. (Feb. 23, 2018), http://www.govtech.com/social/Califomia-Wantsto-Govem-bots-and-Police-User-Privacy-on-Social-Media.html
[https://perma.cc/DLK6STCY].
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 52-55 (2014).
Erin Griffith, Pro-Gun Russian Bots Flood Twitter After ParklandShooting, WIRED (Feb. 15,
2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/pro-gun-russian-bots-flood-twitter-afterparkland-shooting [https://perma.cc/A6G7-SDF4].
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Conversely, bots can engage in false amplifications. When bots coalesce
around a certain hashtag, account, or news story, they can help that topic "trend"
on social media. 62 For example, Russian-linked bots retweeted Donald Trump
approximately ten times more than they retweeted Hillary Clinton in the months
preceding the 2016 election, thereby dramatically increasing the overall amount
of attention given to Trump's tweets. 63 They can flood an administrative agency
with duplicative comments, creating a sufficiently vast amount of content as to
be effectively unreviewable, thereby rendering the notice-and-comment system
nearly meaningless. 64 By "manufacturing consensus," 65 bots can make fringe
viewpoints appear legitimate and newsworthy.66 Oxford Internet Institute
director Philip Howard argues that "[i]f you use enough . . bots and people, and
cleverly link them together, you are what's legitimate. You are creating truth."67
Relatedly, bots can increase the number of followers someone has on social
media, deceiving other social media users into thinking that someone is more
powerful, important, or influential than they really are.68 In the political context,
this is particularly problematic, as a high follower count may suggest that a certain
individual is worth paying attention to, or that her views are popular and widely
accepted. This particular set of problems is extensive enough that platforms are
beginning to respond: Twitter allows automated accounts generally but has a
policy against "aggressive following."69 Occasional bot "purges" by platforms
such as Twitter may cause popular social media accounts to lose thousands or
even millions of followers."
62.
63.
64.

65.

66.

67.

68.
69.
70.
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Creative Bots

In a uniquely creative and enjoyable corner of the Internet, one finds bots as
an art form, such as the creations of programmer-artist Darius Kazemi." These
can vary dramatically in their format. They can be funny, such as Kazemi's
@twoheadlines account, which combines two current headlines from Google
News to create combinations such as "The nuclear agreement is 'the worst
deal ever'-for Dale Earnhardt Jr."72
They can also be informative
(@earthquakebot tweets when an earthquake of 5.0 or greater occurs),"
create art (@greatartbot tweets out a new piece of computer-generated artwork
every four hours74 and now-defunct @pixelsorter resorted the pixels in images
users sent it to create beautiful, soothing images), 5 and even identify the poetry
that humans unintentionally tweet (@accidental575: "I am a robot / that finds
haikus on Twitter / made by accident"; 76 @pentametron: "With algorithms subtle
and discreet / I seek iambic writings to retweet").
Another inventive use of bots comes in the area of academic research.
Innovative researchers have begun using bots to gather information about online
activity. 79 In conducting this research, it may be essential to develop bots that
appear convincingly human. For example, political scientist Kevin Munger used
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We owe this insight to Tadayoshi Kohno, a computer scientist who reminded us that
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humanlike Twitter bots to evaluate the effectiveness of chastisement as a response
to racial harassment online." Munger created Twitter bots, some of which
masqueraded as black men and others as white men, with varying follower counts
in each category." The bots responded to harassing tweets that included the nword with "@[subject] Hey man, just remember that there are real people who
are hurt when you harass them with that kind of language."82 By employing this
technique at scale, Munger was able to gather data indicating that these rebukes
were most effective-that is, they were followed by the sharpest decrease in use of
the n-word-when they came from apparent white male accounts with a high
number of followers." Munger's study exemplifies how bots can be used to
gather data about online activity and, more broadly, the ways that creative bots
can have a positive social influence.
While creative bots may create genuine confusion84 and even chaos," they
typically represent a harmless, imaginative format that provides artists,
researchers, and others with a new tool for expression and inquiry. The fact of
automation permits the botmaker to achieve an audience reach and creative scale
that might be hard to accomplish otherwise. Importantly, some bots achieve their
programmers' artistic or research-driven aims best when users either believe the
account is human-run or cannot tell whether an account is automated. The very
ambiguity around whether the interaction constitutes genuine interpersonal
connection, overt deception, or something else, generates new possibilities for
storytelling and data collection.
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THE COVERAGE QUESTION: IS BOT SPEECH "SPEECH"?

Bots are used by a variety of people for a variety of reasons. We focus here
on a single commonality: the use of bots to communicate online. Due to their
communicative function, our read of the doctrine suggests that any attempt to
limit the use of bots will at least implicate free speech. Such has been the emerging
consensus among First Amendment scholars who have examined automated
speech over the past few years.
This question of "coverage," that is, whether automated speech by bots even
falls within the ambit of the Constitution as protected speech, is only a threshold
question.8 6 If bot speech is covered by the First Amendment-and we agree it
is-then "the full arsenal of First Amendment rules, principles, standards,
distinctions, presumptions, tools, factors, and three-part tests becomes available
to determine whether the particular speech will actually wind up being
protected."" This Part discusses the literature around the First Amendment
coverage of bot speech. Part III then poses a novel question regarding the effect
of First Amendment protection: If bot speech is covered, does the First
Amendment permit the popular intervention of requiring bots to identify
themselves as nonhuman? We conclude both that bot speech is covered and that
the scope of coverage places concrete limits on anticipated bot disclosure laws.
We turn first to the threshold question of whether automated or "robot"
speech is protected under the First Amendment at all. As Frederick Schauer
famously observes, "[t] he speech with which the First Amendment is even slightly
concerned is but a small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our
lives."" While their rationales and justifications vary, there is a rough consensus
among experts that automated speech such as that generated by online bots or
robocallers is among the subset that falls within the Constitution's protection.
The U.S. Supreme Court has enumerated certain categories of
communicative acts that receive varying degrees of protection under the First
Amendment. At its heart, this is a normative determination by the Court about
what the First Amendment ought to protect. For example, pornographic writing
would not be protected under the First Amendment, despite the fact that it takes
the form of written words on a page.8 9 Expressive conduct such as burning a flag,
however, would qualify for First Amendment protection, despite the fact that it
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See Schauer, supra note 11, at 1769.
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lacks a verbal or written component.9 0 The categories of protected and
unprotected speech are complex and often difficult to define. While some have
argued that First Amendment protection should only be extended to speech that
is "explicitly political,"9 1 the Supreme Court has declined to draw such a bright
line. 92 Whether bot speech receives First Amendment protection is a complex
and multifactored analysis.
That bot speech is new is not disqualifying. The Supreme Court clearly
stated that First Amendment protection should not vary by speech medium,
including new media that grows out of developing technology: "Whatever the
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, 'the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's
command, do not vary' when a new and different medium for communication
appears."9 3 The Supreme Court recognized First Amendment protections for the
Internet in 1997 and, a decade later, to depictions of violence in video games. 94
This suggests that the Supreme Court might be willing to treat robot speech
comparably to human speech, so long as other constitutional and statutory
requirements are satisfied. 95
Nor is bot speech categorically excludable from First Amendment coverage
because it fits into a historically recognized category of so-called low-value speech.
In United States v. Stevens, 96 decided in 2010, the Court refused to add depictions
of animal cruelty to its short list of "historic and traditional categories" 9 7 of
unprotected speech, "the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any constitutional problem."9 8 The Court also cautioned
legislatures that they have no "freewheeling authority to declare new categories of
speech outside the scope of the First Amendment."9 9 It did not close the door
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Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Id. at 468 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
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entirely to further judicial identification of unprotected categories, however,
noting that "[m]aybe there are some categories of speech that have been
historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed
as such in our case law.""oo As noted by Alexander Tsesis, the Court's decision
the following year in EntertainmentMerchants Association-in which it found
that nonthreatening depictions of violence were not a historically recognized
category of low-value speech-further established that "the judiciary will not be
deferential to lawmakers' assessments about what speech is low-value and
therefore unworthy of full constitutional protection.""o'
The fact that robot speech is generally unoriginal and just some kind of
repetition or re-splicing of old communications also fails to place it outside the
scope of First Amendment protection. Ultimately, Stuart Benjamin writes, "the fact
that the person or entity claiming to be engaged in speech does not create the
underlying content is irrelevant for purposes of First Amendment coverage."102
There is no requirement that speech be original, creative, or well-reasoned in
order to qualify for First Amendment protection. Therefore, even bots that do
not generate any kind of original content might receive protection under the First
Amendment.
Furthermore, greater attenuation between a human bot creator and her
bot's speech should not change the scope of First Amendment protection. Just
because a statement is ultimately "made" by a robot does not mean that it is not
the product of human creation. Tim Wu notes that "[1] ike a book, canvas, or
pamphlet, the program is the medium the author uses to communicate his ideas
to the world"" in the context of algorithm-generated communicative outputs.
The degree of attenuation between a human creator and her final speech output
can vary widely, and a greater degree of attenuation should not decrease the scope
of First Amendment protection.104 Thus, the fact that a Twitter bot creator may
not know what her creation will tweet next should not place the bot outside the
protection of the First Amendment.
Finally, the First Amendment protects not only the speaker's right to speak
but the right of those who wish to read or listen to bot speech. Even when a great
degree of attenuation exists between the human creator and the final speech
product, the First Amendment may still protect the communication, because it

100. Id.
101. Alexander Tsesis, The CategoricalFree Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY L.J.
495, 500 (2015).
102. Benjamin, supra note 10, at 1463 n.64.
103. Wu, supra note 10, at 1507.
104. Benjamin, supra note 10, at 1464-65.
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protects not only the right to speak but also the right to receive information.10
Would-be listeners or readers can assert their own First Amendment rights even
when the censored speaker lacks First Amendment rights of her own. 10 6 Despite
the current critiques of social media bots for their role in skewing the American
political dialogue online, there are in fact many enjoyable bots that make the
internet a brighter, funnier, and more interesting place."' Thus, the First
Amendment could, for example, protect the rights of internet users who wish to
read tweets from their favorite bots.
The general consensus in the burgeoning literature seems to be that the First
Amendment should apply, for a mixture of the reasons described above. Some
scholars, such as Tim Wu, take a narrow, functionalist view."' Wu distinguishes
between functional communications and actual speech created by machines,

arguing that only the latter falls within the ambit of First Amendment
protection.10 9 Functional communications include things such as car alarms and
mapping software, tools designed only "to assist the user with a task, not to
express to him any ideas or influence his worldview."no By contrast, protected
speech encompasses "blog posts, tweets, online photo streams, and probably
slightly shorter or more symbolic expressions such as Yelp or Amazon reviews
written by humans."" This broad second category would seem to include the
political, commercial, and artistic bot speech that we consider in this Article.
Others such as Stuart Benjamin, Helen Norton, and Toni Massaro assert
that the First Amendment will apply to bot speech and algorithmically generated
speech more broadly.1 12 Noting that "there is a human mind behind all the
algorithms," Benjamin states that "the fact that an algorithm is involved does not
mean that a machine is doing the talking."" Only when machines demonstrate

105. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
106. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764 (1972) (academics asserted their own First
Amendment rights wishing to hear lectures from foreign communist professor whose visa
application was denied).
107. See, e.g., Lainna Fader, 12 Weird, Excellent Twitter Bots Chosen by Twitter's Best Bot-Makers,
NY MAG. (Nov. 9,2015), http://nymag.com/selectall/2015/11/12-weirdest-funniest-smartesttwitter-bots.html [https://perma.cc/NE2V-JEUU]; Zachary M. Seward, The 17 Best Bots on
Twitter, QUARTZ (Oct. 10, 2014), https://qz.com/279139/the-17-best-bots-on-twitter
[https://perma.cc/2PVD-YHSJ].
108. See generally Wu, supra note 10.
109. Id. at 1521-24.
110. Id. at1525.
111. Id. at1524.
112. Benjamin, supra note 10; Massaro & Norton, supra note 10; see also Toni M. Massaro, Helen
Norton & Margot E. Kaminski, Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the
FirstAmendment, 101 MINN. L.REv. 2481 (2017).
113. Benjamin, supra note 10, at 1479.
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such a high level of independent volition that their human creators cannot be said
to direct their substantive message should their communications fall outside the
realm of First Amendment protection, he argues.114
Looking forward to the possibility of strong AI, Massaro and Norton argue
that existing First Amendment doctrine lays the groundwork for protection of
robotic speech, even when it is far-attenuated from any human creator."' They
emphasize that much of our existing free speech protection is predicated on the
importance of "facilitat[ing] listeners' discovery of truth and distribution of
knowledge through a robust exchange of ideas,"ll6 which does not require that
speakers be human.
They also point to an important category of
nontraditional speakers whose speech rights the Supreme Court has already
recognized: corporations."
Ronald Collins and David Skover argue extensively and persuasively for
speech protection for robots on the theory that the First Amendment is and has
always been largely predicated on audience interests, which benefit from speech
irrespective of the speaker." Collins and Skover begin by observing that many
new forms of speech, starting with the written word, were initially met with
skepticism and even censorship. But as the utility of these new forms of
communication became evident, courts began to recognize the need for
protections. Thus, for Collins and Skover, the operative constitutional question
is whether bots and other forms of automated speech have utility, not only to
speakers, but to listeners.1 19
We agree with the emerging scholarly consensus that the First Amendment
likely applies to automated speech. That does not mean, however, that all bot
speech receives absolute immunity from all regulation. Rather, the fact that a
bot plays a role in communication should have little bearing on the
constitutionality of any proposed regulation. Instead, the constitutionality of any
law regulating bots would be assessed pursuant to traditional First Amendment
principles, as discussed in the next Part.

114. Id. at 1481-82.
115. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 10, at 1189. This Article generally discusses speech in the
context of strong Al, which by nature would be far-attenuated from a human creator.
116. Id. at 1178.
117. Id.at1183.
118. See generally RONALD K. L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, ROBOTICA: SPEECH RIGHTS AND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (John Berger ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).
119. Id. at 48-64 (chapter entitled "The New Norm of Utility").
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III.

THE PROTECTION QUESTION: CAN BOTS BE FORCED
TO SELF-DISCLOSE?

This Part goes beyond the threshold question of coverage to examine how
the constitutionality of bot speech regulation might differ from traditional
speech regulation jurisprudence under the First Amendment. For purposes of
discussion, we examine a generic law that would require bots to identify
themselves as nonhuman in all contexts. The ingredients of the generic bill are:
Defines a "bot" as an automated account that interacts socially
online. 120
Requires such a bot to clearly indicate that it is automated.
Numerous commentators have proposed such a requirement.12 1 Recently,
the California Senate overwhelming voted to adopt a bill that applied to "make it
unlawful for any person to use a bot, as defined, to communicate or interact with
natural persons in California online, with the intention of misleading."l22 The
California Assembly later modified the bill such that the law itself narrows its
scope of application to only commercial bots and bots seeking to influence an
election.1 23 Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate has begun to consider a blanket bot
disclosure requirement.1 2 4 Given the diversity of potential laws, we will address
the basic requirement that bots self-identity but also discuss some of the nuances
of the California bill.
The proposals to regulate bot speech that motivate this paper do not amount
to censorship per se. If they "abridge" speech, they do so by requiring a new
category of "speaker" to identify itself as such. The proposals do not even require
the bot to identify precisely who is speaking, only that a person is not. It may
seem tenuous, therefore, to argue that a rule aimed only at requiring calls or social
media accounts by bots to acknowledge no human is behind them even rises to
the level of a restriction. However, the very ambiguity around who is speaking
may form an integral part of the message.12 5 Moreover, it may prove impossible
120. This is to distinguish bots from, for example, web-crawlers (also known as spiders) or
automated trading algorithms.
121. See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 7; Mark Cuban (@mcuban), TWITTER (Jan. 28, 2018, 10:49 AM),
https://twitter.com/mcuban/status/957686987229618176?lang=en [https://perma.cc/EZZ9M569] ("It's time for @twitter to confirm a real name and real person behind every account,
and for @facebook to get far more stringent on the same. I don't care what the user name is.
But there needs to be a single human behind every individual account.").
122. S.B. 1001 § 17941(a), Cal. Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018).
123. S.B. 1001 § 17941(a), Cal. Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as amended by Cal. State
Assemb., June 21, 2018).
124. See Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act of 2018, S. 3127, 115th Cong. (2018).
1 25. See supra Subpart I.C.
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to enforce a bot-disclaimer without identifying an otherwise anonymous speaker
or providing the scaffolding for censorship.
The First Amendment is, of course, a bulwark against government
censorship. Outside specifically delineated circumstances, the government is not
free to curtail protected speech, particularly out of disagreement with its
message.12 6 Thus, were a state to ban all automated speech, all automated speech
on a particular topic, or even all automated speech in a particular category (such
as all commercial speech), then courts would likely see this as an abridgement of
speech in contravention of the First Amendment. Bot disclosure laws, however,
are a far cry from censorship.1 2 7 After all, such laws do not on their face limit the
volume or content of bot speech. Rather, they require only a label informing the
audience about its origins.
Still, a deeper assessment reveals a variety of entanglements with free speech
doctrine. First, forcing a bot operator to reveal that his or her creation is a bot
may amount to compelled speech.12 8 In certain circumstances, such as the
commercial or electoral context, the government may show it is justified in
compelling a person to disclose some fact about herself or her products. But in
others, no such justification may be available. The second is that enforcing bot
disclosure laws will be difficult without compromising the right to speak
anonymously. Bot disclosure proposals to date do not call for unmasking, but
nor do they provide a process by which a speaker can verify she is human without
also confirming her identity. Finally, without expressly censoring anyone, bot
disclosure laws may nevertheless permit or encourage censorship by private
parties or other jurisdictions that lack robust protections for free speech. We
address each of these issues in turn.
A.

Justifying Disclosure

Commentators and legislators propose variations on the same basic rule: to
require automated accounts that interact socially online to identify themselves as
nonhuman. The gravamen of this requirement is that a speaker-the person or
organization behind the bot-must make a claim about the world they would not
necessarily make on their own. Accordingly, bot disclosure laws are best

126. See, eg, Snyderv. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443,458 (2011); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989).
127. Censorship is a somewhat nebulous concept. See Laura E. Little, Laughing at Censorship, 28
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 162-63; Robert C. Post, ProjectReport: Censorshipand Silencing, 51
BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTs & Sci. 32, 34 (1998). We use censorship to refer specifically to removal,
deletion, or silencing of material by government actors.
128. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
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understood as instances of compelled speech. One might also think of bot
disclosure laws as a time, place, or manner regulation, because they predicate the
ability to participate on a special condition.12 9 Under either set of doctrines, the
government must have legitimate ends and pursue those ends through
sufficiently careful means.13 0

1.

Compelled Speech

Compelled speech doctrine is something of a hodgepodge of cases unified
by a single theme. Broadly, it is the notion that the government may not force a
speaker to say something she does not wish to say absent an appropriate
justification."' One subset of compelled speech jurisprudence is the "right of
reply" line of cases. These consider the question of whether a speech-facilitating
entity (such as a newspaper or radio station) can be required to give political
candidates air time or space in print to respond to criticism that the entity
publishes.132 A second subset of compelled speech cases consider when people
may be required to effectively endorse an idea they disfavor, such as driving a car
required to bear New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" license plate slogan or
being required to stand for the Pledge of Allegiance. 3 A third relates to
campaigning, where the courts have upheld reasonable accountability measures
to preserve the sanctity of elections that require attribution for advertisements.134
Generally, the government compels speech most often and with the greatest
success in the realm of commercial products and services. Commercial actors
may be compelled to disclose certain information about their products. For
example, agency regulations may require commercial products to conspicuously
bear "the name and place of business of manufacturer, packer, or distributor,"135

129. See infra Subpart III.A.2.
130. See infra Subpart III.A.3.
131. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled CommercialSpeech and the Consumer "Right to
Know", 58 ARIz. L. REv. 421 (2016); Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth?
Compelled Speech and the FirstAmendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539 (2012); Robert Post,
Compelled CommercialSpeech, 117W. VA. L. REv. 867 (2015).
132. See, e.g, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 372 (1969).
133. See, e.g, Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Wooleyv. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 706 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 627-29 (1943).
134. See, e.g, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995).
135. 21 C.F.R
§ 101.5
(2018); 21 C.F.R §201.1
(2018).
It's current CFR:
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=101.5
and https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfCFR/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=201.1.
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as well as other details such as nutrition information.136 The justification behind
permitting such disclosure requirements is the idea that more information is
generally good for consumers:
Mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does
not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient
exchange of information or protecting individual liberty interests.
Such disclosure furthers, rather than hinders, the First Amendment
goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to the efficiency of the
"marketplace of ideas." Protection of the robust and free flow of
accurate information is the principal First Amendment justification for
protecting commercial speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful
information promotes that goal.' 37

The governing standard of review for commercial disclosures comes from
Zaudererv. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel,' in which the Supreme Court of Ohio
held that the state could require disclosures that are "reasonably related" to
preventing consumer deception.1 3 9
Even Zauderer's relaxed standard of review does not permit unlimited

disclosure requirements, however, particularly when the mandatory disclosure
forces the speaker to express a view adverse to her own position. The Sixth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit disagreed on whether requiring cigarette companies to
include graphic visual warnings on cigarette packaging constituted a permissible
"mere information" disclosurel40 or impermissibly "were aimed at changing
behavior and hence pressed the cigarette industry into regulatory service."l41 The
D.C. Circuit found that such requirements effectively enabled the FDA to force

cigarette companies to spread "an ideological message, a point of view on how
people should live their lives: that the risks from smoking outweigh the pleasure
that smokers derive from it, and that smokers make bad personal decisions, and
should stop smoking." 4 2 The graphic images thus constituted "not warnings, but

136. See generally FDA, NUTRITIONAL LABELING AND EDUCATION ACT (NLEA) REQUIREMENTs (1994),
https://www.fda.gov/iceci/inspections/inspectionguides/ucm074948.htm
[https://perma.cc/3SFL-6ARR].
137. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2001)).
138. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
139. Id.at651.
140. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 556-61 (6th Cir. 2012).
141. Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REv. 773, 777 (2014); see also RJ. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled on limited grounds
by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (overruling with regard to
whether Zauderer standard applies only to correcting deception of consumers).
142. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211.
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admonitions: '[D]on't buy or use this product."'l43 The Supreme Court recently
considered the limits of commercial disclosure requirements, ruling that
providers of pregnancy-related services could not be required to share
information about abortion with patients.144
Similarly, the Supreme Court overturned a California ruling requiring a
private utility company to cede space in its own newsletter (mailed along with
monthly billing statements) to organizations advocating for decreased electricity
consumption in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
145
California.
The Court noted that such a requirement would force the utility
company to effectively endorse speech antithetical to its own interests,
contravening the First Amendment principle that "the choice to speak includes
within it the choice of what not to say."1 4 6 While case law around these kinds of
disclosures is sparse, existing law may generally suggest that the government
cannot force commercial speakers to endorse ideas contrary to their own interests
under the guise of providing consumers with mere information.
2.

Time, Manner, or Place

Time, place, and manner restrictions are relatively common regulations of
speech, especially in the context of public forums.14 7 They include rules limiting,
for example, the time of day when protesters may march, the volume at which a
concert may be played, and the area in which a crowd may gather.1 48 They are
generally upheld by courts absent evidence that the restriction is pretextual or
heavy-handed. And while the majority of Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the constitutionality of time, place, and manner restrictions involves
public forums, the Court has not expressly limited this line of analysis to
restrictions on speech in public forums.1 4 9

Id.
Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
475 U.S. 1, 8, 20-21 (1986).
Id. at 16.
See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941).
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Coxv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965).
149. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, the Court wrote that "even in a public forum
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech" (emphasis added), thus suggesting that a time, place, or manner regulation
could also exist outside the public forum context. This is further supported by the Court's
analysis in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. In addition to analyzing California's requirement that
the private utility company cede space in its billing envelopes to other organizations as
impermissible compelled speech (discussed supra Subpart III.A.1), the Court also considered
the State's argument that the requirement was a time, place, or manner regulation. The Court
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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Time, place, and manner regulations are almost always grouped together in
First Amendment decisions but represent distinct ideas. Regulating time and
place is easily comprehendible, and-if applied fairly-feels intuitively like
reasonable government action. Given the choice between a noisy parade on our
street at 3 a.m. or at 3 p.m., most of us would prefer the afternoon parade. And
given the choice between a march down a public highway that blocks rush hour
traffic or a march through a plaza that only reroutes foot traffic, most commuters
would prefer the latter.
What it means to regulate manner, by contrast, is far less clear. The
Supreme Court ruled that a New York City ordinance requiring that concerts in
Central Park use lower-volume sound systems provided by the city was a
constitutional "place and manner" regulation in Ward v. Rock Against Racism."so
In doing so, the Court did not define "manner," but it did note that the ordinance
"[did] not attempt to ban any particular manner or type of expression.""' In
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court held that barring

protestors from sleeping on federal land in Washington, D.C. to raise awareness
of the problem of homelessness was constitutional as "a reasonable regulation of
the manner in which a demonstration may be carried out." 152 Ultimately, the
concept of manner is less concrete and tidy than time or place, giving courts
ample leeway to determine what constitutes a permissible manner regulation.
Together, these cases suggest that regulating the manner of speech may
result in speakers not always being able to convey their message through their
preferred means. However, the government's ability to restrict these aspects of
speech is also limited. The government may regulate the time, place, or manner
of speech only as long as the regulation (1) is content-neutral; (2) is narrowly

noted that the envelopes constituted a "private forum," yet proceeded with a full time, place,
and manner analysis. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 9,20-21 (ultimately striking down the
regulation as impermissibly content-based). However, even if time, place, and manner
analysis was limited to public forums, there are many online contexts in which the
government does create public forums online where bots may speak. For example, many
suspect bots generated the thousands of identical "citizen" comments to the Federal
Communications Commission when the Commission proposed removing its net neutrality

rules. See Paul Hitlin & Skye Toor, Public Comments to the Federal Communications
Commission About Net Neutrality Contain Many Inaccuraciesand Duplicates, PEW REs. CTR.
(Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/11/29/public-comments-to-the-federalcommunications-commission-about-net-neutrality-contain-many-inaccuracies-andduplicates [https://perma.cc/LL7N-YD9H]. The state may also host online discussion on
websites such as www.whitehouse.gov.
150. 491 U.S. at 803.
151. Id. at 802.
152. Clark, 468 U.S. at 297.
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tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) leaves open "ample
alternative channels" to communicate the information."'
The first of these prongs, content neutrality, is a cornerstone of First
Amendment protection. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content."154 With regard to time, place, and manner, the
content neutrality requirement demands that the regulation must be "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' As clarified by the
Supreme Court in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, content-based discrimination is easily
conflated with viewpoint-based discrimination. 15 6 Any regulation aimed at a
particular subject matter is not content-neutral, "even if it does not discriminate
among viewpoints within that subject matter."' By way of example, the Court
noted that "a law banning the use of sound trucks for political speech-and only
political speech-would be a content-based regulation, even if it imposed no
limits on the political viewpoints that could be expressed."' Thus, a valid time,
place, or manner regulation must be specific only to particular noncontent
elements of speech, such as volume, location, or format. It may not apply
specifically to certain subject matters.
3.

Means and Ends

Whether the government is seeking to compel speech or seeking to regulate
the manner of speech, the key inquiry is the same: First Amendment doctrine
requires narrow tailoring to a significant government interest. Achieving this
narrow tailoring is neither straightforward nor simple. A significant government
interest could be anything from reducing crime 5 9 to national security1 60 to
protecting citizens from unwelcome and excessive noise, even in traditional
public forums such as parks. 161 Government interventions also tend to be
highly context-specific. While there may be plausible justifications for regulating
a particular type of bot, it is difficult to imagine a justification that makes sense
across multiple contexts.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 293 (citations omitted).
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
135 S. Ct. 2218,2230 (2015).
Id.
Id.
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425,430 (2002).
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,611 (1985).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
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It is far easier to conceive of narrowly tailored context-specific regulations,
however. For example, commercial bots could be regulated under similar
principles as other for-profit social media accounts. The FTC requires celebrities
and "influencers" on social media to disclose material connections with a
company when they endorse a product, such as the fact that the company is
paying them.162 By requiring social media users to disclose the fact that they
receive a financial benefit for their posts, the FTC aims to promote "the basic
truth-in-advertising principle that endorsements must be honest and not
misleading."l63 Requiring disclosure of the fact that a speaker is automated in the
commercial context seems similarly reasonable in light of the way we
communicate in the digital era. This is bolstered by the fact that commercial
speech generally receives a lower standard of protection than political, artistic, or
other kinds of speech. Under the intermediate scrutiny Central Hudson test, a
commercial speech regulation will survive so long as it directly advances a
substantial government interest and is not more extensive than necessary.164
In light of the widespread concern about foreign interference in the 2016
presidential election through social media bots, an automation disclosure
requirement could be justified by a significant government interest with regard
to political bots in particularsettings. Even so, the line between "political" bots
and private individuals expressing political views is a hazy one.165 So too is the
line between "election" related speech and general political speech-as the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed when it struck down Minnesota's ban on
"political" apparel in polling places.166 Thus, while preserving free and fair
elections can serve as a compelling reason for requiring political bots to disclose
their bot-ness when engaged specifically in electioneering, a different justification
than preserving elections would be necessary in all other political contexts.

162.

163.
164.
165.
166.

The FTC's Endorsement Guidelines: What People Are Asking, FTC: Tips & ADVICE (Sept. 7,
2017), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/ftcs-endorsement-guideswhat-people-are-asking [https://perma.cc/6MK3-3XF6].
Id.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980).
See generally Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (deciding
whether issue advertisements constituted express advocacy or its functional equivalent).
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018). In striking down the ban on "political"
apparel in polling places, the Court emphasized the inherent vagueness in the notion of
political apparel: "[P]erfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of
regulations that restrict expressive activity." Id. at 1891 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 794). "But
the State's difficulties with its restriction go beyond close calls on borderline or fanciful cases.
And that is a serious matter when the whole point of the exercise is to prohibit the expression
of political views." Id.
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Even if the same rationales behind FTC and FEC regulations could justify
regulation of commercial and political bots, respectively, the question remains
whether any rationale could justify disclosure by all bots in all settings. At a
minimum, any omnibus attempt to require all bots to identify themselves in all
contexts would need to be a sort of Frankenstein's monster of government
interests, where the government enumerates one or more significant rationale for
each context it governs. 1 67 Moreover, when new uses for bots emerge, the
legislature would need to revisit regulations and provide additional, responsive
rationales. Ultimately, any omnibus bot disclosure bill seems doomed to be
overinclusive, and thus likely to censor valuable speech. Moreover, the unique
value of that speech may rely in part on the ambiguity of whether the speaker is
automated or human.
Arts and entertainment furnish good examples. Science fiction is replete
with figures whose basic humanity is in question, or where the dramatic tension
depends on an ambiguity as to the nature and origins of a particular character. 168
Society's obsession with the Turing test-which asks whether a robot can fool a
human into thinking it is not a robot-shows no signs ofwaning. 1 6 9 Online artists
and storytellers increasingly incorporate bots and use them as a unique medium
of expression."o These artists may express themselves through the intentional
haziness of social media accounts that make us ask, "Is it a bot or not?" Forcing
an artist to say whether a person is behind, for example, @MagicRealismBot,
which may or may not be an automated source for magical realism storylines,"
interferes with his or her ability to tell a story in a particular way.
It is difficult to imagine what government interest would justify the
obstruction of that creativity. This inquiry is closely tethered to the final prong of
time, place, and manner analysis, which asks whether the speaker has alternate

167. We owe this insight to David Skover.
168. See, e.g, NEAL STEPHENSON, THE DIAMOND AGE: OR, A YOUNG LADY'S ILLUSTRATED PRIMER
(1995).
169. See, eg, Gary Marcus, What Comes After the Turing Test?, NEWYORKER- ANNALSOF TECH. (June
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/what-comes-after-the9,
2014),
turing-test [https://perma.cc/T7JY-AK6E]; Lance Ulanoff, Did Google Duplex Just Pass
the Turing Test?, MEDIUM (May 8, 2018), https://medium.com/@LanceUlanoff/didgoogle-duplex-just-pass-the-turing-test-ffcfe6868bO2
[https://perma.cc/XV4A-V6PD];
Yongdong Wang, Your Next New Best FriendMight Be a Robot, NAUTILUS (Feb.
4,
2016),
http://nautil.us/issue/33/attraction/
your-next-new-best-friendmight-be-a-robot [https://perma.cc/6YEF-8WZN].
170. Neyfakh, supra note 71.
171. See Ethan Chiel, Magic Realism Bot Can Meet Some of Your Very Specific Literary Needs,
SPLINTER (Nov. 24, 2015), https://splinternews.com/magic-realism-bot-can-meet-some-ofyour-very-specific-1-1793853236 [https://perma.cc/24LN-62X9].
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channels of communication available to convey her message.172 In the artistic
context, it seems unlikely that an algorithmic artist whose work hinges on
the uncertainty of whether her account is human-run could effectively
communicate her message through alternative channels of communication.
This requirement is less problematic for commercial bots, as there are ample
alternative means of communicating commercial advertisements."' Moreover,
a disclosure requirement seems unlikely to detract from a commercial speaker's
message in the first place. That is not the case, however, for artistic bots, whose
premise often rests on the ambiguity of their place on the robot-human spectrum.
In addition to the prospect of bot disclosure laws being overinclusive-in
the sense of sweeping in more speech than is needed to effectuate the
government's goals-there is the prospect that bot disclosure laws will be
underinclusive. Take, for example, the pending California legislation. The
legislative history for SB 1001 specifically mentions Russian interference with the
2016 United States election in part through the use of automated accounts. 174
The bill itself mentions electoral interference.7 Presumably, the idea is that
California citizens will be better protected against manipulation if they
understand the source of the message to be a bot.
However, as political bot researchers such as Philip Howard and Samuel
Woolley show, many of the harms ofbots occur at scale. 176 These include creating
the perception that a politician is more popular than he is by padding his
following; causing a particular idea or theory to "trend," that is, to be highlighted
as popular by a platform; and "hijacking" a hashtag that could further legitimate
discussion or community building by flooding it with nonsense or vitriol. While
a spot check may reveal that certain followers, amplifiers, or distractors are not
real people, ultimately the harm is experienced in the aggregate. Unmasked bots
can still perpetuate these scale-base harms, calling into question whether, for
example, California's restriction of speech is accomplishing the government's
ends. A large enough disconnect between the harm and the solution jeopardizes
the means-ends requirement that any valid manner regulation must satisfy.

172. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
173. Billboards, television advertisements, and other forms of online advertising, just to name a
few.
174. S.B. 1001 § 17941(a), Cal. Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as amended by Cal. Senate, Mar.
14,2018).
175. S.B. 1001 § 17941(a), Cal. Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (prohibiting the use of
unidentified bots to "influence a vote in an election").
176. Philip N. Howard, Samuel Woolley & Ryan Calo, Algorithms, Bots, and Political
Communication in the U.S. 2016Election: The ChallengeofAutomated PoliticalCommunicationfor
Election Law andAdministration, 15 J. INFo.TECH. & POL. 81, 83-91 (2008).
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The most obvious response to the means-ends fit problem is to proceed in
a piecemeal fashion, regulating only certain types of bots-commercial or
electioneering bots, for example-and justifying each intervention separately. As
we discuss in the final Part of this Article, we believe this to be the wiser course
for regulators: A government body interested in regulating bot speech should
articulate the specific harm or harms in a particular context that justify imposing
limits there."' It is important to note, however, that such an approach forecloses
justifying a given law as a mere time, manner, and place regulation. This is so
because time, manner, and place regulations must be content-neutral, that is, they
may not privilege certain categories of speech over others."' Rather, the proper
free speech analysis for a law, such as California's, that singles out categories of
speech such as commercial or electoral is that of coerced speech.
B.

Unmasking Through Enforcement

Imagine for the purpose of argument that the government furnished a
variety of legitimate justifications for bot disclosure in narrow contexts where the
state has the authority to regulate. For example, the state might successfully
invoke consumer protection interests to enact a law that requires self-identification
when using an automated agent for marketing, or might invoke the sanctity of
the election process in prohibiting automated attempts to influence an election
without disclosure.17 9 Such laws would likely be facially constitutional so long as
they did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
However, absent careful thought regarding the enforcement mechanism,
actual application of such statutes could nevertheless veer into unconstitutional
territory. To date, no bot disclosure proposal has described the specifics of how
such a requirement would be enforced. Among our chief concerns is the prospect
that enforcement of a generic bot disclosure law would interfere with the right to
speak anonymously. Unmasking the status of a bot as a bot differs from
penalizing an anonymous speaker. But unmasking anonymous speakers may be
inevitable absent the establishment of a mechanism by which a human can prove
her status as a natural person without divulging her identity.
Arguably distinct from other forms of mandatory disclosure, which
typically require information about the subject of speech rather than the speaker,
the right to anonymity is well-established in American jurisprudence.

177. See infra Part III.
178. See supra Subpart III.A.2.
179. Again, drawing the line between election-related and other political speech is notoriously
difficult. We are assuming the problem is tractable for purposes of this Subpart.
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Discussions of the right inevitably begin with the Federalist papers.180 However,
the Supreme Court did not directly speak on the issue of anonymity protection
until the mid-1900s. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,"' the Court held
that Alabama could not require the local NAACP chapter to provide it with a list
of names of its members. This decision was derived from the First Amendment
right to freedom of association rather than freedom of speech.18 2 Noting that
disclosure of NAACP membership lists had exposed members to threats, public
hostility, and economic harm in the past, the Court reasoned that compelling
disclosure would adversely affect the group's ability to advocate effectively.18 3 The
Court found freedom of association to be inextricably linked to the right to
"privacy in one's associations."l 84
The right to anonymity was first formally linked to free speech protection
two years later in Talley v. California,' in which the Supreme Court struck down
a municipal ordinance that prohibited the distribution of handbills that did not
include the name and address of the person issuing them. The Court reasoned
that an identification requirement would "tend to restrict freedom to distribute
information" and thus, by extension, would inhibit freedom of expression.1 8 6
Accordingly, the Court found that protection of the right to speak anonymously
constituted an integral component of the right to express minority political views:
"Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an
important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from
time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices
and laws either anonymously or not at all.""
The Court reaffirmed a staunch protection of the right to speak
anonymously thirty-five years later in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 88
in which the Court struck down an Ohio law prohibiting the distribution of
campaign literature that did not contain the name and address of the person
issuing it. Drawing a parallel to the well-founded right to vote anonymously, the
Court articulated that Talley had established "a respected tradition of anonymity

180. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Connm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 n.6 (1995).
181. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

182. See id. at 460-62.
183. See id. at 462-63.
184. Id. at 462.
185.

362 U.S. 60 (1960).

186. Id. at 64.
187. Id.

188. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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in the advocacy of political causes" 8 9 that serves as "a shield from the tyranny of
the majority." 90
As Margot Kaminski notes, the McIntyre decision departed from the
emphasis on minority political dissent found in Talley and NAACP and shifted
towards a broader protection of anonymity as an element of expression
generally:1 91 "Anonymity is a means of expressing oneself, and an author has the
freedom to decide whether or not to disclose his or her true identity. An author
may choose to be anonymous because of fear of retaliation, concern about social
ostracism, or a desire to protect his or her privacy; the Court implied that the
precise reason does not in fact matter."1 9 2
Litigation furnishes another relevant context. Although the existence of the
right to bring suit under a pseudonym is well-established, the Supreme Court has
not yet delineated the contours of when pseudonymous litigation is
permissible.19 3 A plaintiff must first obtain permission from the court in order to
proceed without revealing her real name,1 94 and although the Supreme Court has
permitted the practice in numerous cases 9 5 (perhaps most famously in Roe v.
Wade),19 6 it has never expressly addressed when a plaintiff may litigate
pseudonymously. The Circuit Courts permit the practice according to varying
standards, many of which include consideration of factors such as whether the
plaintiff would be forced to reveal sensitive personal information if not permitted

189. Id. at 343.
190. Id. at 357.
191. Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to
Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 834-35 (2013).
Anti-mask laws prohibit the wearing of masks in public. Id. at 848.
192. Id. Kaminski has written extensively on the right to anonymity in the context of anti-mask
laws, arguing that "[t]he variation in anti-mask statutes suggests that legislatures, like courts,
struggle with determining when anonymity is functional and when it is expressive." Id. at 850.
The Supreme Court has not spoken specifically on the matter, and lower courts have
interpreted the anonymity protections enumerated in Talley and McIntyre varyingly in the
anti-mask context. Id. at 850-74. Some decisions find that they established an independent
right to anonymity under the First Amendment, while others characterize the right as a
component of the right to free expression. Id. Other courts declined to apply the First
Amendment altogether in the context of anti-mask laws, most notably the Second Circuit in
its Kerik decision. Id. at 865 (discussing Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v.
Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004)).
193. Jayne S. Ressler, #WorstPlaintiffEver: PopularPublic Shaming and Pseudonymous Plaintiffs,
84 TENN. L. REV. 779, 810-11 (2017).
194. A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and the Law in the United States, in LESSONs FROM THE
IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 441, 458 (Ian
Kerr et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
195. Id.
196. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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to proceed pseudonymously,197 whether the plaintiff seeks to challenge
government activity,198 the risk of prejudice or unfairness to the defendant, 199 the
potential for retaliatory harm to the plaintiff,200 and whether the plaintiff is a
child.201
The protection of anonymity established in these and other cases is powerful
but not absolute. Under the broad First Amendment protection of the right to
anonymity in "core political speech" (as in Talley and McIntyre), a law must
survive strict (or "exacting") scrutiny.202 The government bears the burden of
proving that a challenged law is narrowly tailored in furtherance of a compelling
state interest. 20 3 Accordingly, there are two particular areas where courts have

recognized valid government interests that justify unmasking: electoral speech
and at certain points in litigation.
Electoralspeech. In McIntyre, the Court noted that a narrow identification
requirement might be justified on the basis of certain government interests.204
Although anonymity protection is at its highest in the context of political speech,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the government interest in preserving the
integrity of the electoral process is so compelling that it occasionally satisfies
unmasking requirements specifically in the political speech context. For example,
the Court upheld a Washington law requiring the state to release the names of
signatories to ballot referendum petitions upon request under the Public Records
Act.2 05 The Court recognized that signing a referendum petition is expressive, as
it communicates the message that the signatory supports the referendum, or at
the very least thinks it should be put to a vote. 2 06 However, the Court upheld the
law on the basis of the fact that it did not suppress speech, but rather required
disclosure of more information, coupled with the fact that the disclosure was
intended to strengthen the integrity of the electoral process.207 That same year,
the Court upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's disclaimer and
disclosure requirements for campaign advertisements in Citizens United v.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See, e.g, James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1993).
See, e.g, id.; Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560-61 (6th Cir. 2004).
See, e.g, Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004).
See, e.g, Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
See, e.g, James, 6 F.3d at 238-39; Porter, 370 F.3d at 560-6 1.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Conm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 334-35 (1995).
See id.; First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 353.
See John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
Id. at 195.
See id. at 197. Note that this was a facial challenge; the Court did not rule on the validity of the
Public Records Act disclosure requirement as applied in the context of a marriage amendment
referendum. See Kaminski, supra note 191, at 839.
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FEC.208 In doing so, the Court emphasized the public's "informational interest"
and the importance of "making informed choices in the political marketplace."2 0 9
The limits of what must be disclosed in order to preserve the integrity of the
electoral process are unclear. The line between signatures on a pamphlet and
signatures on a referendum ballot initiative is quite thin, and it is difficult to
discern how the Court would rule on other election-related disclosure
requirements. Several justices on the Reed Court argued that Reed and McIntyre
should have reached the same result, including Justice Scalia, who would have
reached the opposite result in McIntyre,2 1 0 and Justice Thomas, who believed that
neither law was justified under strict scrutiny.211
Litigation. The standards for unmasking anonymous defendants vary both
by jurisdiction and by the nature of the claims at issue. When a plaintiff sues for
defamation, the most widely employed standards for unmasking an unknown
212
defendant (usually an online speaker) are variations on the New Jersey Dendrite
standard: First, plaintiffs must notify anonymous speakers in order to provide
them with a reasonable opportunity to contest a potential unmasking; second,
they must identify precisely which statements are allegedly defamatory; third,
they must produce prima facie evidence supporting every element of their claim;
and finally, the court must weigh the risk of unmasking the defendant against the
harm to the plaintiff on a case-by-case basis.2 13 Less stringent anonymity
protections apply to third parties in litigation such as witnesses and subpoena
recipients. For example, in Branzburgv. Hayes,21 4 the Supreme Court held that
requiring journalists to reveal their sources when subpoenaed by a Grand Jury
did not violate the First Amendment.2 1 5

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 369, 367.
Reed, 561 U.S. at 219-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 239 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
See Jason A. Martin & Anthony L. Fargo, Anonymity as a Legal Right: Where and Why It
Matters, 16 N.C. J.L. &TECH. 311, 342 (2015).
214. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
215. The Ninth Circuit's recent ruling in United States v. Glassdoor, 875 F.3d 1179, 1191 (9th Cir.
2017), extended this reasoning to hold that anonymous employee reviewers on
Glassdoor.com could be subject to court-ordered unmasking in the context of an ongoing
government investigation into workplace fraud. While the Ninth Circuit's Glassdoorruling
has already been the subject of extensive criticism by First Amendment advocates for its failure
to take the unique qualities of online speech into account, see, e.g, Lisa A. Hayes, Anonymous
Speech Online Dealta Blow in U.S. v. Glassdoor Opinion, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &TECH. (Nov.
8, 2017) https://cdt.org/blog/anonymous-speech-online-dealt-a-blow-in-us-v-glassdooropinion [https://perma.cc/TW32-7LU4], it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court
will intervene. Thus, for the time being, it seems that anonymous speakers may be unmasked
in the context of grand jury subpoenas.

Regulating Bot Speech

1023

In short, the First Amendment protects the right to speak and even litigate

anonymously. The exceptions are narrow and vary by context, such that officials
and courts may require self-disclosure if there is a pressing enough need. The
trouble with generic bot disclosure laws-and each version of actual bills we have
seen introduced-is that they fail to provide for a process for accused humans to
prove they are not actually bots. This issue will only become more acute as bots
become more adept at mimicking people.
Consider a hypothetical Twitter account that frequently tweets eccentric
critiques of local politicians. One such politician, up for reelection, objects to a
pattern he sees whereby the account replies to ("@") comments of his followers
with variations on the same criticism of his record. This politician suspects that
the account is actually a bot and refers the matter to a local prosecutor, citing a
bot disclosure requirement around election-related speech. If the prosecutor
agrees, how will she go about enforcing the statute?
Calls for bot disclosure bills are silent on this point. But it is of critical
importance to preserving the right to speak anonymously, for the only way to
investigate, let alone prosecute, the politically critical account is to pursue the
person or people behind it. If the account is a bot and its operator stands in
violation of the statute, then the platform (here, Twitter) will have to disclose the
operator's identity for purposes of facing charges. But if there is a real person
behind the account, that person will also have to come forward and prove they
are, in fact, human. As there is no mechanism in place for verifying that a person
is a person without revealing which person, we must assume virtually every
instance of enforcement will involve unmasking.
There are a number of means to domesticate the unmasking problem. For
example, Twitter and other platforms could devise a system by which to certify
the human status of users without using their real names. Or Twitter could
automatically detect and label bots (thereby removing user discretion). As we
discuss in the final Subpart of this Part, Twitter might simply ban automated
accounts to avoid the hassle. A trusted third party could accomplish the same by
creating a process whereby a person could attest that they are the speaker behind
an accused account.216
The problem with these and similar approaches, apart from the fact that
they do not exist as of this writing, is that they are not officially sanctioned.
Neither the prosecutor nor the accuser is obligated to take the platform or a third
party's word for the humanness of an accused account, let alone that of the
accused herself. The prosecutor could, in theory, continue to pursue the claim up

216. We owe this insight to commentary by Michael Froomkin.
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to the point of unmasking the person behind it. It is hard to see how this
unmasking would be justified under the narrow exceptions to the right to
anonymous speech. But it is equally difficult to see how bot disclosure laws would
ever be enforced if the person behind the account could not be identified.
Today this problem might be mitigated by the ease with which the human
behind an account can prove they are human merely through their ability to
engage in dynamic conversation. Although they date back decades, chat bots are
still in their infancy; telling a person from a bot is not hard due to bots' limited
discursive capabilities. The problem becomes more and more acute, however, as
bots become increasingly capable of dissembling convincingly. Already "robocallers," or phone-based bots, deny that they are automated.2 17 Future bots could
have specific protocols for facing down accusers, including reaching out for help
from a person who is on call for this purpose.218
C.

Automating Censorship

A final consideration sounds less in First Amendment doctrine than in
general principles of free speech in cyberspace. A general requirement that bots
disclose themselves in a sense delineates "bot speech" as a separate category.
Sometimes we do draw such lines around speech. For example, commercial
speech-defined as speech that "propose[s] a commercial transaction"-exists
apart from other forms of expression and may be amenable to greater control.21 9
As we discussed in Part II, certain communication falls outside of speech
protections altogether.220 But there seems to be no basis by which to lump all bot
speech together as a category. To do so, especially at this early stage of its
development, would prejudge bot speech and perhaps enable or even encourage
the censorship of that speech.
Successfully requiring bots to self-identify could lead to attempts to limit bot
speakers in new ways. As discussed above, no official path exists by which to
contest accusations of automation without exposing the real person behind the
speech at issue. Platforms may respond to this messiness by prohibiting
bot speech altogether so as to avoid getting between the user and the accuser. This

217. Dvorsky, supra note 30.
218. Indeed, while we do not address the question in this Article, the prospect of human-bot
hybrids seems to present special difficulties in drafting bot disclosure rules.
219. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
220. See supra Part II.
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would dramatically reduce the volume and variety of bot speech on the Internet,
all without official censorship.221
Even absent choices by platforms, if all bot speakers must identify
themselves as fitting in a unitary category-nonhuman speech-then all speech
online becomes searchable and sortable. The very sortability of bot speech could
lead to further demands, if not by government, then by individuals and groups,
that platforms create a means by which to identify and block all speech in the
bot category. This action would not be state action, of course. But because
the disclosure requirement that makes such blocking possible would be a
government mandate, subsequent platform blocking would be enabled by state
action. Because these platforms operate internationally, in foreign jurisdictions
wherein the First Amendment does not apply, a U.S.-based bot disclosure
requirement could empower non-U.S. officials to block bot speech entirely as a
category-for example, if bots are being used to criticize the governmentwithout having to do the work of identifying bots.
In cyberlaw terms, broadly applied bot disclosure laws will alter the
architecture, and with it the regulability, of an emerging form of digital speech.222
While this form of regulation may not register to courts as violating the First
Amendment, bot disclosure laws nevertheless implicate the forms and
possibilities of human communication and hence, free expression itself.
IV.

REGULATING BOT SPEECH: A CASE FOR CAUTION

To summarize the argument so far: Bots have many forms and purposes. In
some cases, bots have contributed to a variety of information-based harms. These
harms are visible enough to occasion calls for and attempts at regulation,
specifically in the form of a requirement that bots disclose themselves as
nonhuman. Although such a requirement seems unproblematic from a
First Amendment perspective, a deeper analysis reveals a variety of free speech
concerns. These include the difficulty of narrowly tailoring regulation to the
government interest at stake, as well as the prospect that questions around
anonymous speech and other related issues will arise in the enforcement of bot
disclosure laws.
We do not deny that bots generate significant harms in the current
environment. Nor do we argue against the regulation of bots, including

221. See Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liablefor Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 916-18 (2002)
(discussing how strict regulation of online content in general encourages excessive selfcensorship by internet services providers and third-party platforms).
222. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 32 (2006).
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potentially through mandatory disclosure. Rather, we believe that current
approaches-which contemplate blanket requirements of bot self-disclosure
without reference to context-tend to offend principles of free speech. And we
worry more broadly about the free speech consequences of attempting to channel
a new medium of speech at its inception. Accordingly, in this final Part, we urge
caution and self-restraint in regulating this widely varied and still emerging form
of communication.
Eight years ago, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the
Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the government could treat
violent, interactive videogames as unprotected speech.22 3 The Court, without
denying (or affirming) the prospect that violent videogames could be harmful,
answered this question with a resounding no. "[W]hatever the challenges of
applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology," the Court observed,
the requirements of the First Amendment "'do not vary' when a new and different
medium for communication appears."2 2 4 Indeed, the government is not free to
add new categories of unprotected speech merely because the legislature
"concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated."2 25
Like videogames, bots can be a vehicle for speech that society finds
problematic-speech that, for instance, foments strife, deeply offends, or
attempts to manipulate. But this capacity for harm does not confer a license
upon the state to shunt bots into a category of speech deserving of lesser
protection. And the harms of bots should be considered not only alongside the
potential benefits, but with the understanding that bots represent-like
videogames or even the Internet-an emerging form of speech. The scale issues
that make bots problematic also permit an engagement at scale. The very
ambiguity between human and machine that makes bots feel dangerous is also a
source of novel forms of expression, research, and critique.
Ultimately, the communicative potential of bots urges, if not inaction, then
at least caution.
We therefore conclude this Article with a series of
recommendations to policymakers around how best to approach bot speech in
these early days.
First, to the extent feasible, governments should begin by updating and
leveraging existing law to address harms caused by bots. If the concern is, for
instance, bots being used to harass individuals or groups, to exploit the elderly,

223. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011); see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460, 472 (2010) ("Our decisions... cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority
to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.").
224. Brown, 564 U.S at 790 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
225. Id. at 791.
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children, or other vulnerable individuals, or to interfere with an election, then
each of these problems might be addressable without enacting new, untested laws
with the capacity to infringe on speech.
Second, and relatedly, governments should regulate bot speech, if at all,
through individual restrictions aimed at (1) particular categories of bots, (2)
within specific contexts, and (3) supported by the specific harms the government
hopes to mitigate. Thus, for example, if the concern is commercial bots leaving
scathing reviews on Yelp about competitors, or political bots created by Political
Action Committees coordinating with a candidate or his campaign, governments
should address these concerns specifically rather than require all bots to behave a
particular way. As discussed above, however, any such intervention should be
assessed under a coerced speech standard, because mere regulations of time,
manner, and place must be content-neutral.
Legislatures might consider starting with regulation of commercial bots,
given the lower standard of scrutiny generally applied to commercial speech and
the well-established importance of consumer protection and other related
interests. Governments should in all instances interrogate whether their
proposed solution sweeps in harmless speech and, conversely, whether it actually
addresses the harmful activity at issue. And they should acknowledge that, for at
least some categories of bot speech, the requirement to self-identify itself operates
as a restriction on expression.
Third, governments should anticipate and address inevitable issues around
enforcement. With respect to a generic bot disclosure law, there will be many
instances in which an official or citizen suspects noncompliance. It is the
government's obligation to create a viable, constitutional path by which
individuals and groups can prove they are compliant without having to give up
speech rights such as the right to speak anonymously. Such a path could include
a means by which the platform or another third party can verify the human
nature of a given account, or provide penalties for attempting to silence an
individual by falsely reporting her to be a bot. Despite the many precedents
devoted to proceeding anonymously in public or in court, no bot disclosure
scheme proposed to date gives any guidance on this question.226
And fourth, governments should acknowledge the downstream effects of
officially differentiating between bot speech and other forms of online
communication. In theory, bot disclosure laws merely offer signals to individuals
226. As discussed above, California's law prohibits misleading consumers or citizens as to the
human nature of the bot but does not specify any procedure for verifying that a bot is human
without unmasking the person behind it. No such procedure appears in the federal bill
around political bots nor in any call for bot regulation we have seen in the press.
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as they navigate a complex information ecosystem. But in practice, those signals
may come to serve as the scaffolding for private or, outside of jurisdictions with a
robust free speech tradition, public censorship of bots as a category of speech.
Perhaps limitations of bot speech will arise from market forces as platforms such
as Twitter and Facebook respond to user demand for greater civility and
transparency. The question is under what conditions governments can, or at any
rate should, alter the character of speech to make it more susceptible to various
forms of suppression.
We believe our analysis of the speech concerns around bot disclosure yields
certain lessons. Other analyses and experiences may yield many more. None of
these principles, alone or in combination, guarantees the constitutionality of bot
disclosure or other laws that affect bot speech. But together they point the way
toward more thoughtful interventions geared to address the automated speech
phenomenon without arbitrarily limiting a new and still unfolding
communication medium.
CONCLUSION

In their aforementioned book on rights in robot speech, Collins and Skover
observe a certain pattern around new technologies of communication.22 7
Beginning as far back as the written word, novel forms of information and media
have been met with skepticism. This skepticism has in turn led to censorship: of
the written word, of the printed page, of the Internet. Over time, however, Collins
and Skover observe that useful technologies of communication have found a way
to flourish.2 2 8 Free speech has expanded to meet these technologies largely on
their own terms.
Time will tell whether the many and varied bots of today and tomorrow
meet this threshold of utility. They have already displayed the capacity for
significant mischief, and some measure of wonder. This Article has shown that a
popular response to the harms of bots may look innocuous on the surface but,
upon deeper analysis, implicates core free speech concerns. Bots represent a new
form of communication-whether in their capacity to surprise, their ability to
produce speech at scale, or the way in which some bots test our intuitions about
the boundary between person and machine. This novelty is frightening and even
harmful. Any response must nevertheless be measured and respect age-old
principles of free expression.
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